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SUMMARY:An exact solution method for binary equilibrium problems with 
 compensation and the power market uplift problem\; Dr. Daniel Huppmann
  (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA))
UID:cbefe67e-ca17-46fd-a7a6-a681e354290f
DESCRIPTION:ABSTRACT: We propose a novel method to find Nash equilibri
 a in games with binary decision variables by including compensation pa
 yments and incentive-compatibility constraints from non-cooperative ga
 me theory directly into an optimization framework in lieu of using fir
 st-order conditions of a linearization\, or relaxation of integrality 
 conditions. The reformulation offers a new approach to obtain and inte
 rpret dual variables to binary constraints using the benefit or loss f
 rom deviation rather than marginal relaxations. The method endogenizes
  the trade-off between overall (societal) efficiency and compensation 
 payments necessary to align incentives of individual players. We provi
 de existence results and conditions under which this problem can be so
 lved as a mixed-binary linear program. We apply the solution approach 
 to a stylized nodal power-market equilibrium problem with binary on-of
 f decisions. This illustrative example shows that our approach yields 
 an exact solution to the binary Nash game with compensation. We compar
 e different implementations of actual market rules within our model\, 
 in particular constraints ensuring non-negative profits (no-loss rule)
  and restrictions on the compensation payments to non-dispatched gener
 ators. We discuss the resulting equilibria in terms of overall welfare
 \, efficiency\, and allocational equity.
DTSTART:20180110T140000Z
DTEND:20180110T150000Z
LOCATION:Seminarraum Mathematik 04.363
DTSTAMP:20260730T200644Z
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